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Abstract
We show that Zheng (2002)’s optimal mechanism in the presence of resale
can be interpreted as an equilibrium of an ascending-price auction and, in the
two-bidder case, as an equilibrium with a no-regret property of the English
and second-price auctions. We also show that it can be extended beyond
Zheng (2002)’s original assumptions.
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1Zheng’s Optimal Mechanism with Resale
and the Second-Price Auction.
1. Introduction
In the independent private value model with possible resale between bid-
ders, Zheng (2002) constructs a selling mechanism that, under some assump-
tions, implements Myerson (1981)’s allocation. The mechanism is thus opti-
mal among all selling mechanisms, even those that can prevent resale. This
result is important since, in many cases, resale is too costly or impossible to
prevent.
We ﬁrst interpret, in Section 2, Zheng ’s mechanism as an equilibrium of
an o n - s t a n d a r da s c e n d i n g - p r i c ea u c t i o nw i t hs e q u e n t i a le n t r y . I nS e c t i o n s3
and 4, we then show that, with 2 bidders, it is equivalent to an equilibrium,
with a no-regret property, of the standard English and second-price auctions.
Furthermore, the English and second-price auctions implement the op-
timal allocation under more general assumptions than Zheng (2002)’s. In
fact, from the three assumptions for the two-bidder case in Zheng (2002),
we only keep unchanged Assumption 3—the Resale Monotonicity Assump-
tion. We replace Assumption 1, which requires that the hazard rates be
strictly increasing, by the standard assumption that the virtual-value func-
tions be strictly increasing (the “regular case” in Myerson, 1981). We drop
Assumption 2—the Uniform Bias Assumption—, according to which the valua-
tion supports are nested and the hazard rates are ranked. Consequently, we
allow valuation distributions with overlapping supports and without relation
of stochastic dominance between them.
We show in Section 5 how Zheng’s mechanism itself can be amended to
deal with such less restricted distributions.
Our results follow from a recent contribution on standard auctions with
resale (Lebrun, 2006), which, through a link with the common-value model,
characterizes an inﬁnity of equilibria of the second-price auction with resale.
Mylovanov and Tröger (2006) investigate the generality of Zheng (2002)’s
2assumptions, especially in the n-bidder case. Calzolari and Pavan (2005) ob-
tain optimal mechanisms with resale for a two-bidder model where the values
are distributed over two-point supports and where the bargaining powers at
resale depend on the bidders’ identities. They then implement their optimal
mechanisms through, depending on the values of their parameters, ﬁrst-price
auctions with limited sets of acceptable bids (and speciﬁc tie-breaking rules)
or second-price auctions with personalized reserve prices.
2. Zheng’s Mechanism as an Ascending-Price Auction.
In Zheng (2002), the bidders’ hazard rates are ranked: a lower index
bidder has a higher hazard-rate function. Starting with bidder 1, Zheng ’s
mechanism examines the bidders sequentially according to increasing index
order and awards the item to the ﬁrst bidder i who passes the following test:
the transformation, through the pre-speciﬁed function βij, of the value bidder
i submits is not smaller than the value bidder j submits, for all j>i .
A bidder is called the “leader” when it is his turn to be examined. When
t h ec u r r e n tl e a d e rp a s s e st h et e s t ,t h ep r i c eh ep a y sf o rt h ei t e mi s ,i fh e
is the highest index bidder, his personalized reserve price or, if he is not, a
pre-announced and speciﬁc nondecreasing transformation of his bid. When
he fails the test, the mechanism updates the reserve prices of all remaining
possible winners and examines the next leader. At the equilibrium of this
mechanism, the bidders truthfully reveal their values.
This mechanism can be naturally interpreted as an equilibrium of an
acsending-price auction that allows only two bidders at a time and starts,
at the initial stage, with bidders 1 and 2. The high bidder may stay on for
the next stage, where the new bidder allowed in will be the bidder whose
index comes next after the maximum of the current-stage bidders’ indices2.
2Under Zheng (2002)’s “Transitivity Assumption,” we do not need, when there is a
change of leader to compare the new leader’s transformed value with bidders’ values that
have already been compared with the previous leader. The same assumption implies here
that the high-bidder will bid higher in the next stage than in the current stage. From the
3If there is no such new bidder, the high bidder wins the auction and pays
a price calculated from his bid and his reserve price. The leader is, in this
interpretation, the current high bidder.
Every time the stage high bidder changes, the auctioneer informs the
potential participants to the future stages of their reserve prices, which he
has updated using the bids submitted by the losers in the previous stages.
Otherwise, the bidders’ actions are kept secret. The rules governing the
updating of the reserve prices and the winner’s payment can be chosen to
obtain an equilibrium that mimics the honest equilibrium of Zheng’s mech-
anism, that is, where bidder i bids according to the function βij, j>i ,i fh e
is the previous-stage high bidder and is matched with bidder j and bids his
v a l u ei fh ei st h en e wb i d d e r .
Obviously, this auction with sequential entry is very diﬀerent from the
standard ascending-price auctions: the price may increase discontinuously at
the start of a new stage, at no stage does the high bidder observe the low
bidder’s bid, and the bid of the last losing bidder does not always determine
the ﬁnal price. In the next sections, we show that, at least in the two
bidder case, Zheng’s mechanism is exactly equivalent to an equilibrium of
the standard English and second-price auctions, where the winner observes
and pays the maximum of the loser’s bid and the reserve price.
3. The English and Second-Price Auctions with Resale
3.1 The Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction with Deferred Payment
In this section, we extend some known results about the second-price
auction. Consider the independent private values model with two, possibly
heterogeneous, risk-neutral bidders. Bidder i’s use value vi for the item being
auctioned is distributed over an interval [ci,d i],w i t h0 ≤ ci ≤ di,a c c o r d i n g
ranking of the hazard rates, the new added bidder bids higher than the previous stage low
bidder. In this auction interpretation of Zheng’s mechanism, we may thus assume that
the price is ascending and that exit is irrevocable.
4to an absolutely continuous probability measure Fi, with a strictly positive,
continuous, and bounded density function fi over (ci,d i], i =1 ,2.W e u s e
the same notations F1 and F2 for the cumulative distribution functions. A
bidder’s use value is his private information.
We allow a reserve price and personalized entrance fees. No bidder
observes his opponent’s participation decison. We add a post-auction stage
where resale takes place between bidders if and only if the auction has resulted
in the sale of the item and the auction winner proposes a resale price the loser
agrees to.
We ﬁrst consider the sealed-bid second-price auction where the auctioneer
keeps the number of bids and their values secret, announces only the identity
of the winner, if any, and delays the announcement of the auction price until
after the resale stage. In the deﬁnition of a regular equilibrium below, r is
the reserve price.
Deﬁnition 1:
(i) A regular bidding function βi of bidder i is a real-valued function,
nondecreasing and continuous from the right over [ci,d i],e q u a lt o−1 over
[ci,c 0
i), not smaller than r over [c0
i,d i], constant over [c0
i,c 00
i),a n ds t r i c t l y
increasing and continuous over [c00
i,d i],w h e r ec0
i,c 00




(ii) A regular resale-oﬀer function γi of bidder i i sab o u n d e da n dm e a s u r -
able (with respect to the σ-algebra of the Borel subsets) function deﬁned over
[ci,d i]×[r, +∞) and such that γi (v;b) ≥ v, for all (v,b) in [ci,d i]×[r, +∞).
(iii) A regular strategy of bidder i is a couple σi =( βi,γi) where βi is a
regular bidding function and γi is a regular resale-oﬀer function.
(iv) A regular equilibrium (σ1,σ 2) is a couple of regular strategies that
can be completed3 into a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
If bidder i with use value vi follows the bidding function βi, he participates
3By adding beliefs and by adding what responses every bidder gives to oﬀers from the
other bidder at the resale stage, as functions of past observed histories.
5in the auction, pays his entrance fee, if any, and bids βi (vi) when vi ≥ c0
i and
does not take part in the auction when vi <c 0
i. If he follows the resale-oﬀer
function γi,h eo ﬀers γi (vi;b) at resale after winning the auction with the
bid b.
Deﬁnition 2:
(i) For all i =1 ,2,b i d d e ri’s virtual-value function ωi is deﬁned over
(ci,d i] as follows:
ωi (vi)=vi −
1 − Fi (vi)
fi (vi)
.
If ωi is strictly increasing, ωi (ci) is the value, possibly inﬁnite, of its contin-
uous extension at ci.
(ii) Let ωi be strictly increasing over (ci,d i],f o ra l li =1 ,2.L e t t h e
optimal-resale-price function ρ be the function deﬁned over [c1,d 1] × [c2,d 2]
such that, for all (w1,w 2) in [c1,d 1] × [c2,d 2],
ρ(w1,w 2)=i n f
½
p ∈ (cl,d l]|wk ≤ p −




where k and l are such that {1,2} = {l,k} and wk ≤ wl,t h a ti s ,l ∈
argmaxi wi and k ∈ argmini wi.
(iii) Notation: ρ1 (v,w)=ρ2 (w,v)=ρ(v,w),f o ra l l(v,w) in [c1,d 1] ×
[c2,d 2].
In Deﬁnition 2 (ii), ρ(w1,w 2) is the resale price that maximizes bid-
der k’s expected payoﬀ when bidder k’s use value is wk and bidder l’s use
value is distributed according to Fl conditionally on belonging to the interval
[cl,w l]. Indeed, in this case, bidder k’s maximization problem is equivalent
to maxp∈[wk,wl] (p − wk)(Fl (wl) − Fl (p)),w h o s eﬁrst-order condition is (ii).
According to the notation (iii), ρi is the function ρ with bidder i’s use value
as its ﬁrst argument.
6In Result 1 below, αi = β
−1
i is the “extended” inverse of βi that is con-
tinuous from the right, that is, β
−1
i (b)=s u p{vi ∈ [ci,d i]|βi (vi) ≤ b},f o ra l l
b in {−1} ∪ [r, +∞). The functions γ1,γ2 are the smallest optimal resale-
oﬀer functions. We show in Appendix 1 how to extend the proof in Lebrun
(2006), which deals with the particular case of the same valuation interval,
mandatory participation, and no reserve price or entrance fees, to our more
general setting.
Result 1 (from Lebrun, 2006): Let ω1 and ω2 be strictly increasing.
Let c0
i,c 00







Let ϕ be a real-valued function strictly increasing and continuous over [c00
1,d 1]
such that ρ(v1,ϕ(v1)) is strictly increasing and ϕ(c00
1)=c00
2, ϕ(d1)=d2.L e t
r,e1,a n de2 be a reserve price and entrance fees such that:
r ≤ c
00














2),e 2 (r)=( c
0
2 − r)F1 (c
00
1).
Let (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be the following couple of regular strategies:
β1 (v1)=−1,i fv1 ∈ [c1,c
00
1),
= ρ(v1,ϕ(v1)),i fv1 ∈ [c
00
1,d 1];
β2 (v2)=−1,i fv2 ∈ [c2,c
0
2),










,i fv2 ∈ [c
00
2,d 2];
γ1 (v1;b)=ρ(v1,max(v1,α 2 (b)));
γ2 (v2;b)=ρ(max(α1 (b),v 2),v 2);
7where αi is the extended inverse of βi, i =1 ,2,f o ra l lv1 in [c1,d 1], v2 in
[c2,d 2],a n db in [r, +∞). Then, we have:
(i) (Equilibria) (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) is a regular equilibrium of the second-price
auction where payments are deferred, ties are broken in favor of bidder 1,
and with reserve price r and personalized entrance fees e1,e 2.M o r e o v e r , t h e
following equalities hold true:
β1 (v1)=β2 (ϕ(v1)),
ρ(α1 (b),α 2 (b)) = b, (1)
for all v1 in (c00
1,d 1] and b in (ρ(c00
1,c 00
2),ρ(d1,d 2)).
(ii) (Sets of Optimal Bids) If vi in [c0
i,d i] is such that βi (vi) <v i,t h e n




are optimal for bidder i with use
value vi,w h e r eβ (vi)=m a x( {r} ∪ {w ∈ [c00
1,d 1]|ϕ(w)=w ≤ vi}).
(iii) (Final Equilibrium Allocations) Let λ
ϕ be the function deﬁned over


















¢¢−1 (v1),i fϕ(v1) ≤ v1 ≤ min(ρ(d1,d 2),d 1);
λ
ϕ (v1)=d2,i fv1 ≥ min(ρ(d1,d 2),d 1).
If v2 >λ
ϕ (v1), the item goes eventually to bidder 2. If v2 <λ
ϕ (v1) and
v1 ≥ c00
1, the item eventually goes to bidder 1. If v2 <λ
ϕ (v1) and v1 <c 00
1,
the item stays with the auctioneer.
The intuition for Result 1 comes from a link between our model and the
common-value model. Optimal resale under incomplete information at least
remedies the “worst cases” of ineﬃciency, where the auction loser’s use value
is the highest one the winner thinks possible, that is, when both bidders
8submit the same bid. In this case, each bidder’s net value for winning is
equal to the resale price: by winning a bidder saves the resale price if he
would be a buyer at resale and earns it if he would be a reseller. At an
equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order condition (1) thus follows. As in the common-
value second-price auction, the multiplicity of equilibria described in Result
1 ensues from this, common to both bidders, condition.
To illustrate (ii), consider, for example, bidder 2 with use value v2 such
that he could not be the reseller, that is, such that α1 (β2 (v2)) <v 2.L e t a
bid b be such that:
α1 (b) <α 2 (b) and b<v 2.( 2 )
When, at equilibrium, bidder 1 submits such a bid b and wins, he proposes
(from (1)) b at resale, which bidder 2 accepts. Since the prices are identical,
bidder 2 is indiﬀerent between winning the auction against such a bidder
and losing it and thus between submitting b and submitting slightly diﬀerent
bids. The set of optimal bids in (ii), to which β2 (v2) belongs, is the closure
of the interval of such bids b’s.
Checking that the ﬁnal allocation is as in Result 1 (iii) is simple. For
example, assume v1 ≥ c00
1 and ϕ(v1) ≥ v1. From the deﬁnition of the bidding
functions and of λ
ϕ, λ
ϕ (v1) ≤ ϕ(v1)=α2β1 (v1).I f v2 <λ
ϕ (v1),b i d d e r2
loses the auction and refuses bidder 1’s resale oﬀer. If λ
ϕ (v1) <v 2 <ϕ(v1),
bidder 2 loses the auction and accepts bidder 1’s resale oﬀer. If ϕ(v1) <v 2,
bidder 2 wins the auction and no advantageous resale is possible.
3.2 The Standard Second-Price and English Auctions.
We now consider the second-price auction where, as it is standard, the
auction winner learns the auction price—the maximum of the reserve price
and the loser’s bid—right at the conclusion of the auction. As in the pre-
vious subsection, the bidders’ bids are kept secret. We need to extend our
deﬁnition of a regular equilibrium to “behavioral” strategies.
9Deﬁnition 3:
(i) A regular bidding strategy Gi (.|.) of bidder i is a regular condi-
tional probability measure4 with respect to vi in [ci,d i].
(ii) A regular resale-oﬀer function δi of bidder i is a bounded and
measurable function deﬁned at all (vi,b i,b) in [ci,d i]×[r,+∞)
2 and such that
δi (vi;bi,b) ≥ vi,f o ra l ls u c h(vi,b i,b).
(iii) A regular strategy of bidder i is a couple (Gi (.|.),δi) where
Gi (.|.) is a regular bidding strategy and δi is a regular resale-oﬀer function.
(iv) Bidder i’s beliefs are regular if they are represented by a regular
conditional probability measure Fj (.|.,.) with respect to (bi,b) in [r, +∞)
2
such that b ≤ bi.
(v) A regular equilibrium is a couple of regular strategies and a cou-
ple of regular beliefs (G1 (.|.),δ1,F 2 (.|.,.);G2 (.|.),δ 2,F 1 (.|.,.)) that can be
completed into a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The measure Fj (.|bi,b) represents the revised beliefs bidder i holds about
bidder j’s use value after winning the auction with the bid bi and learning his
payment b. If bidder i with use value vi follows (Gi (.|.),δi), he chooses his
bid according to Gi (.|vi) and, if he has won the auction with the bid bi and
has to pay b,h eo ﬀers δi (vi;bi,b) at resale. Result 2 below is an extension
to the case with reserve price and entrance fees of a result in Lebrun (2006).
Result 2 (from Lebrun, 2006): Let ω1 and ω2 be strictly increasing.
Let E be a regular equilibrium as in Result 1 of the second-price auction
with deferred payment. Then, there exists a regular equilibrium E0 of the
standard second-price auction with the same reserve price, entrance fees, and
tie-breaking rule, such that:
(i) (Equivalent Outcomes) The bid marginal distributions, the in-
terim total expected payoﬀs, and the ﬁnal allocation are the same in as E.
Conditionally on the use value of the auction winner, resale takes place with
the same probability as in E and, when this probability is diﬀerent from zero,
4Also called “stochastic kernel” and “transition probability distributions.”
10a tt h es a m ep r i c e ;
(iii) (No-Regret Property) In E0, all bids in the support of Gi (.|vi)
are optimal bids in [r,+∞) for bidder i even after learning his payment in
case of winning, for all vi in [c0
i,d i] and all i =1 ,25.
If bidder 1’s entrance fee e1 is equal to the maximum entrance fee e1 (r),
then (i) and (ii) also hold true for any tie-breaking rule.
Let E =(β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be a regular equilibrium as in Result 1. The
proof of Result 2, which we outline in Appendix 2, consists in constructing an
equilibrium E0=(G1 (.|.),δ 1,F 2 (.|.,.);G2 (.|.),δ2,F 1 (.|.,.)) with the required
properties. Here, assume that ties are broken in favor of bidder 1. In
Appendix 3, we explain the minor modiﬁcations a diﬀerent tie-breaking rule
requires. Because bidder 1’s bid distribution is atomless in E,t h ea u c t i o n
winner’s revised beliefs are the same whether he wins with a bid strictly
higher than or equal to his payment and hence are independent of his bid.
We may thus consider simpliﬁed revised beliefs Fj (.|.) that depend only on
the payment. Since bidder i will be willing to oﬀer a resale price that is
also independent of his bid, we construct in E0 resale-oﬀer functions that are
simpliﬁed functions6 δi (vi;b). A sw es h o wi nA p p e n d i x2 ,i ti sp o s s i b l et o
construct E0 in the following four steps.
Step 1: Construction of the supports: If vi is in [c0
i,d i] a n ds u c ht h a t
βi (vi) <v i, the support of Gi (.|vi) is the interval of optimal bids in Result
1 (ii). Otherwise, the support of Gi (.|vi) is {βi (vi)}.
Step 2: Construction of revised beliefs F1 (.|.) and F2 (.|.) that are con-
sistent with the supports in Step 1 and such that, when advantageous resale
is possible, the auction winner ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer the same resale price
5However, bidder i might regret his entry decision. Notice that learning the payment
in case of winning and learning the other bidder’s bid are equivalent when c0
2 = c00
2,s i n c e
then bids are diﬀerent from the reserve price with probability one.
6Such a resale-oﬀer function is formally deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 1 (ii). However, here
the second argument of δi is bidder i’s payment and not his bid.
11as in E.
Step 3: Construction of the bidding strategy Gi (.|.) as the conditional
distribution of the bid with respect to the use value from the joint distribution
of the use value-payment couples generated by the marginal Fiαi over [r,+∞)
of bidder i’s payment in E and the conditional Fi (.|.) from Step 2.
Step 4: Extension of the construction of optimal regular resale-oﬀer func-
tions from the domains in Step 2, where resale is possible, to the whole deﬁ-
nition domain such that the resale oﬀer does not depend on the bid from the
auction loser along the equilibrium path.
If, as it is common, we interpret a bidder’s acceptable bid as the price at
w h i c hh ee x i t st h ea u c t i o n ,E0 in Result 2 also deﬁnes an equilibrium of the
English auction, with initial entrance fees, no information release about the
number of active bidders, and where the price starts rising from the reserve
price.
4. Optimality of the Second-Price and English Auctions
Assume that the initial seller has some use value v0 for the item and that
the virtual-value functions are strictly increasing. From Myerson (1981), the
seller maximizes his expected payoﬀ if he keeps the item when no bidder has
a virtual value larger than v0, sells it to the bidder with the highest virtual
use value otherwise, and leaves no payoﬀ to the bidders with the smallest
possible use values. We make the following “nondegeneracy assumption”
which rules out those trivial cases where one bidder’s virtual value is never
larger than v0 or than the other bidder’s virtual value7:
min(d1,d 2) > max(v0,ω 1 (c1),ω 2 (c2)).
7 If, for example, d2 ≤ v0 or d2 ≤ ω1 (c1), the optimal allocation is implemented by the
second-price auction where the reserve price and entrance fees are such that only bidder 1
with virtual value larger than v0 takes part (or, equivalently, a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer to
bidder 1). There will be no proﬁt a b l er e s a l et ob i d d e r2 .
12Then, the “screening levels”, that is, the smallest use values c0
1,c 0
2 at which





i (max(v0,ω1 (c1),ω2 (c2))),( 3 )
for all i =1 ,2. Without loss of generality, we may assume c0
1 ≤ c0
2.







for all v1 in [c1,d 1]. Any optimal mechanism allocates the item to bidder 2
if v2 >ψ(v1) and to bidder 1 if v1 >c 0
1 and v2 <ψ(v1).
If there exists a strictly increasing and continuous function ϕ∗ such that
ϕ∗ (c0
1)=c0
2, ϕ∗ (d1)=d2,a n dλ
ϕ∗
= ψ,w h e r eλ
ϕ∗
is as deﬁn e di nR e s u l t1
(iii) (Section 3.1), then the regular equilibrium of the second-price auction
constructed from ϕ∗ will implement the optimal allocation. In fact, according
to Result 1 (iii) (Section 3.1), it will allocate the item according to λ
ϕ∗
= ψ.
Assumption A below guarantees the existence of such a function ϕ∗.
(Weak) Assumption A: ω1 and ω2 are strictly increasing and:
(i) The unique continuous function µ2 deﬁned over C = {v1 ∈ (c0
1,d 1]|ψ(v1) ≥ v1}
and such that µ2 (v1) ≥ ψ(v1) and ρ(v1,µ 2 (v1)) = ψ(v1),f o ra l lv1 in C,i s
(nondecreasing) strictly increasing.




−1 (v2) ≥ v2
ª
a n ds u c ht h a tµ1 (v2) ≥ ψ
−1 (v2)
and ρ(µ1 (v2),v 2)=ψ
−1 (v2), for all v2 in D, is (nondecreasing) strictly in-
creasing8.
The existence of the functions µ1,µ 2 as deﬁned above comes from the
continuity and, when diﬀerent from the lower extremities of the supports,
the strict monotonicity of ρ. When Assumption A is satisﬁed, we simply
8 It is straightforward to show that the continuous extension of the inverse ψ
−1
of ψ is uniquely determined over [c0





−1 (ρ(min(d1,d 2),d 2)) = ρ(d1,min(d1,d 2)).
13construct ϕ∗ from µ1 and µ2 as follows: ϕ∗ = µ2 over C and ϕ∗ = µ
−1
1
over µ1 (D). If, given a reserve price r∗ ≤ c0
1, the entrance fees are equal
to their maximum values e1 (r∗) and e2 (r∗),d e ﬁn e di nR e s u l t1( S e c t i o n
3.1), the bidders’ equilibrium payoﬀs vanish at the screening levels c0
1,c 0
2,
and Theorem 1 below then follows from Myerson (1981).
Theorem 1: Let Assumption A be satisﬁed. Let r∗,e 1 (r∗),e ∗
2 (r∗) be as
in Result 1 (Section 3.1) where c0
1,c 0




2 = µ2 (c0
1). Then, the second-price and English auctions with reserve
price r∗, entrance fees e1 (r∗),e 2 (r∗), and arbitrary tie breaking rule have
a regular equilibrium that satisﬁes the no-regret property (deﬁned in Result
2 (iii), Section 3.2) and that is optimal among all incentive-compatible and
individually rational mechanisms.
Notice that if the screening levels c0
1,c 0
2 are identical, the reserve price
r∗ = c0
1 suﬃces, since then ei (r∗)=0 ,f o ra l li. From Result 1 (Section 3.1),
optimality is also achieved by a regular equilibrium of the sealed-bid auction
with deferred payment, the same reserve price and entrance fees, and where
bidder 1 wins ties.
If we require, as in the Weak Assumption A, the functions µ1 and µ2 to
be only nondecreasing, the same construction as above will produce a nonde-
creasing function ϕ∗ with, possibly, discontinuity jumps under the 45-degree
line and ﬂat portions above the 45-degree line. If we allow in our deﬁ-
nitions bidding functions with discontinuity jumps above the reserve price
and bidding strategies mixing over nonconvex supports, our results extend
straightforwardly to this case. Under Zheng (2002)’s “Uniform Bias As-
sumption,” according to which the use value supports are nested and the
hazard rates are ranked, that is, [c1,d 1] ⊆ [c2,d 2] and ω1 (.) ≥ ω2 (.) (and,
consequently, c0
1 ≤ c0
2 and C =( c0
1,d 1]), our Weak Assumption A reduces to
his “Resale Monotonicity Assumption9.”
9Zheng (2002) uses the notation β12 for our ϕ∗. A referee summarized our extension
of the construction of ϕ∗ as follows: “The idea is to observe, from the continuity of the
Myerson allocation, that if the Myerson allocation favors bidder i against j at xi,t h e n
14In Appendix 4, we explicitly work out one of Zheng (2002)’s examples.
5. Back to Zheng’s Mechanism.
Zheng’s mechanism also uses ϕ∗ from our previous section to determine
the mechanism “winner,” to whom it awards the item, from the use values
v1,v 2 the bidders provide as inputs (see footnote 9). Under Zheng (2002)’s
assumptions, ϕ∗ (v1) is never below v1 and hence only bidder 1 can be a
reseller at equilibrium. When he is awarded the item, bidder 1 pays a price
that depends only on his own input and such that his total expected payoﬀ
is equal to his expected payoﬀ, conditional on the intermediate allocation,
from Myerson’s optimal mechanism. When bidder 2 is awarded the item,
he pays the smallest use value at which, given bider 1’s use value, Myerson’s
mechanism would have awarded him the item.
From our results, Zheng’s mechanism can easily be amended to accom-
modate those cases that satisfy the Weak Assumption A (Section 4) and
where hazard rates are not ranked. In such a case, the function ϕ∗ can
cross the 45-degree line and bidders 1 and 2 can be resellers at equilibrium.
The mechanism may simply require from each bidder a payment equal to
his total expected payment, including the entrance fee and conditional on
his use value and the identity of the winner, at our optimal equilibrium of
the second-price or English auction. As for bidder 1 in Zheng’s original
mechanism, a bidder’s payment then depends only on his own input and is
such that his total expected payoﬀ, which includes his payoﬀ from the resale
stage, is equal to his expected payoﬀ from Myerson’s mechanism, conditional
on the intermediate allocation.
A winner of this amended mechanism learns the same information as in
the optimal equilibrium of the sealed-bid auction and hence will propose
it continues to favor i against j at any x0
i suﬃciently close to xi. Then within this
neighborhood of xi one can derive a winner-selection rule βij as β12. Then do that for all
neighborhoods, within each of which the relationship of favoring one against the other is
stable. Then patch up all the winner-selection rules βij obtained locally, and we obtain
a global winner-selection rule, ...”
15the same resale price. Truth-telling is an equilibrium of Zheng’s amended
mechanism, otherwise bidders would deviate from their equilibrium strategies
in the second-price auction.
With n bidders, Zheng’s mechanism can be amended to ﬁt cases that
satisfy all his assumptions with the exception that the hazard rates of bidders
n−1 and n may not be ranked between them. In fact, the mechanism looks
for a winner by inspecting bidders in increasing index order. Once it reaches
bidder n − 1, it reduces to a two-bidder mechanism, which we can then
amend as above. This change is inconsequential to the behaviors of bidders
at earlier stages.
6. Conclusion.
We showed that Zheng (2002)’s optimal mechanism in the presence of
resale can be interpreted as an equilibrium of an ascending-price auction
and, in the two-bidder case, as an equilibrium with a no-regret property of
the English and second-price auctions. It is somewhat surprising that such a
novel and apparently complex mechanism actually describes an equilibrium
of more familiar auctions. We also showed that it can be extended beyond
Zheng (2002)’s original assumptions.
Appendix 1: Outline of the Proof of Result 1 (Section 3.1)
Assume that β1,β2 are the regular bidding functions the bidders are ex-
pected to follow at auction. Assume bidder i is declared the winner in any
tie that may occur with strictly positive probability. Bidder i’s updated
beliefs about bidder j’s use value after winning the auction with a bid bi
are represented by the conditional of Fj on [cj,α j (bi)]. Then, as stated in
the main text, γi (vi;bi)=ρi (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))) in Result 1 is the smallest
resale price that maximizes his expected payoﬀ.
Assume that the bidders choose their resale prices according to these
resale-oﬀer functions. When looking for regular equilibria, we may focus
16on the diﬀerence between bidder i’s expected utility and his expected utility
from losing with probability one. In fact, his utility when losing ul
i does not
depend on his bid. Then, bidder i’s net value ui for winning, that is, the
diﬀerence between his utility when winning (gross of the auction price) uw
i
and his utility when losing ul





= ρi (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))), if not larger than vj;
= ρj (vj,max(vj,α i (bj))), if not larger than vi;
= vi, otherwise;
for all couple of bids (b1,b 2) in ({−1} ∪ [r,+∞))
2,c o u p l eo fu s ev a l u e s(v1,v 2)
in [c1,d 1] × [c2,d 2],a n di,j such that {i,j} = {1,2}.
Since bidder i’s bid can enter his net value only as an argument of his
resale price, which, we have assumed, he chooses optimally, b0
i = bi is a












dFj (vj).( A 1 . 1 )
By, as in Lebrun (2006), applying an envelope theorem, we ﬁnd the ﬁrst
property below, which allows to circumvent the direct dependence of ui on
the own bid bi. The other properties also mainly follow from Lebrun (2006)10.
Properties of the Net-Value Functions: Assume β2 (c00
2) ≥ β1 (c0
1) and
β1 (c00
1) ≥ β2 (c0
2),w h e r ec0
i,c 00
i and βi are as in Deﬁnition 1 (i), for all i =1 ,2.
10Below, we use (iii.2) to prove the optimality of the participation decisions. Lebrun
(2006) did not need this property because he assumed mandatory participation.

































(ii) Common Value for Pivotal Bids when Bidding as Expected: For all
b in (maxi βi (c00
i),mini βi (di)):
u1 (α1 (b),α 2 (b);b,b;β1,β2)=u1 (α1 (b),α 2 (b);b,b;β1,β2)=ρ(α1 (b),α 2 (b)).
(iii) Monotonicity with Respect to Own Type: For all b in (maxi βi (c00
i),mini βi (di))













dFj (vj) is nondecreasing with
respect to vi in [ci,d i].
Proof: W ea m e n dt h ep r o o fo f( i )i nL e b r u n( 2 0 0 6 )t ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n t
the possible jump of βj at c00


















and the equality in (i) holds true over this interval.











In fact, from its deﬁnition and the continuity from the right of αj,i ti s













. Applying the envelope theorem as in Lebrun (2006)























From the previous paragraph, the equality in (i) follows.




is then proved as in
18Lebrun (2006) (by reasoning as in the ﬁrst paragraph above).
(ii) and (iii.1) are proved as in Lebrun (2006).







if he proposes his optimal resale price ρi (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))) when he wins.
It is thus the maximum of the net expected payoﬀ h eo b t a i n sw h e nh ep r o -
poses pi, over all possible resale prices pi. Since, for any ﬁxed pi,h i sn e t
expected payoﬀ is nondecreasing in his use value vi, so will his optimal net
expected payoﬀ. (iii.2) is proved. ||
Result 1 (i) is an easy consequence of the properties above. In fact,
bidder i’s expected net payoﬀ when his use value is vi and his bid b is in
(maxi βi (c00




















Since, at an equilibrium, b should be optimal for vi = αi (b),w eo b t a i nt h e
following ﬁrst-order condition:
ρ(α1 (b),α 2 (b)) = b.
From Property (iii.1), the “second-order” condition is satisﬁed and any bid
the bidding function speciﬁes at or under the reserve price is optimal in this
range. Bidder i’s entrance fee ei is chosen in Result 1 such that it is not
larger than bidder i’s expected net payoﬀ at c0
i and equal to it when c0
i >c i.
From Property (iii.2), the participation decision is optimal and any couple
of strategies as in Result 1 form an equilibrium.
As in Lebrun (2006), from the ﬁrst-order condition and the envelope
property we obtain the sets of optimal bids in Result 1 (ii). Result 1 (iii)
can be proved as indicated in the main text.
Appendix 2: Outline of the Proof of Result 2 (Section 3.2).
19Step 1 of the construction of E0 from E is a simple deﬁnition. To show
how Step 2 can be carried out, consider, for example, b in (c0
2,ρ(d1,d 2))






,w h e r eϕ
+
2 (b)=m i n ( {d2} ∪ {w ∈ [c00
1,d 1]|ϕ(w)=w ≥ b}).F o r
all w in this interval and not larger than ρ(d1,d 2),i no r d e rf o rb i d d e r1
with use value α1 (w) to propose the same price w he would propose in
E, w must maximize bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ at resale. Integrating the








determines F2 (.|b) over this interval. Because no
resale price larger than ρ(d1,d 2) is proposed along the equilibrium path of E,






when ρ(d1,d 2) <ϕ
+
2 (b) and thus d1 <ϕ
+
2 (b)=d2. In this case, an example
of equilibrium beliefs is obtained by extending the ﬁrst-order condition and,







(w − e α1 (w))f2 (w|b)=1 − F2 (w|b)




e α1 (w) − w
dw,( A 2 . 1 )
where e α1 is the continuous extension of α1 over [r,d2] such that ρ(e α1 (b),d 2)=
b,f o ra l lb in [ρ(d1,d 2),d 2]. Formula (A2.1) indeed deﬁnes a probability dis-
tribution with the speciﬁed support because its R.H.S. tends towards one as
v2 tends towards ϕ
+
2 (b) (for a proof, see Lebrun, 2006)12.
In the general case, for the purpose of deﬁning the revised beliefs and,
as we show below, the strategies, the function αi, for all i =1 ,2,i se x -
tended as a continuous and nondecreasing function e αi over [r,max(d1,d 2)]
11This necessary ﬁrst-order condition will actually be suﬃcient and w will be the optimal
resale oﬀe rf o rb i d d e r1w i t hu s ev a l u eα1 (w).
12When the payment b is the reserve price, the revised beliefs must account for the pos-
sibility that bidder 2 did not take part in the auction. If F2 (c00
2) > 0,w eh a v eF2 (v2|b)=
F2 (v2)/F2 (c00
2), for all v2 in [c2,c 0




















i,max(d1,d 2)] such that:
ρ(e α1 (w), e α2 (w)) = w,( A 2 . 2 )
for all w in [r,max(d1,d 2)]. From Result 1 (i), such extensions are possible.
As the example above where d1 <d 2 shows, only at most one function among
α1,α 2 needs to be extended strictly.
Step 3 leads to a bidding strategy of bidder i if and only if the marginal
distribution F∗
i of the joint distribution generated by Fiαi (over [r, +∞))
and Fi (.|.) is equal over [c0
i,d i] to the actual distribution Fi of bidder i’s use
value. To show that this is indeed the case, take, for example, v in [c0
2,d 2]












2} ∪ {w ∈ [c00











the ﬁrst-order condition (A2.1) holds true. Integrating it with respect to
the payment b,w eﬁnd that F ∗








t h es a m ed i ﬀerential equation that, from (A2.2), F2 satisﬁes. Because these
two cumulative functions coincide at the extremities of this interval, they are
identical everywhere inside it (for more details, see Lebrun 2006)13.
Step 4 can be carried out by deﬁning the following resale-oﬀer function,









,i fvi ∈ [ci,c
0
i) and b = r;
=m a x ( vi,d j),i fb>ρ(d1,d 2);











, the explicit formula for 1 − G2 (b0|v2) can
be obtained by diﬀerentiating (A2.1) with respect to v2, integrating with respect to b from









f2 (v2)(v2 − e α1 (v2))
.
21If we then deﬁne as in Appendix 1 the net-value functions u1,u 2 from
these resale-oﬀer functions, we obtain the properties below. Because we
only consider βi,βj from E, we drop them from the argument of ui.N o t i c e
the change of lower extremity in (i) with respect to the similar property in
Appendix 1. Since here the utility in case of winning does not depend on
the own bid, we compare the expected utility to the expected utility from
winning with probability one, that is, for all use values of the opponent.
Properties of the Net-Value Functions:
(i) For all vi in [ci,d i] and all bi in [r, +∞):
(i.1)
Z
ui (vi,v j;bi,b)dFj (vj|b)
=
Z
ui (vi,v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b),










ui (vi,v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b)dFjαj (b).
(ii) For all b>c 0
2:
Z
ui (αi (b),v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b)=ρ(α1 (b),α 2 (b)).
(iii) For all b ≥ r,
R
ui (vi,v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b) is nondecreasing with respect
to vi in [ci,d i].
Proof: (i.1) is immediate since, from Step 4, the net-value of the auction
loser at resale does not depend on his bid. (i.2) follows from (i.1). (ii) holds
22true because resale occurs with probability one when both bidders submit the
same bid b (and α1 (b) 6= α2 (b)). If, for example, α2 (b) >α 1 (b), bidder 1’s
use value is α1 (b) and bidder 1’s resale oﬀer ρ(α1 (b),α 2 (b)) is accepted with
probability one by bidder 2, since it is the minimum of the revised support
of his use value. (iii) can be proved as (iii.2) in Appendix 1. ||
Proceeding as in Appendix 1, we obtain in E0 t h es a m es e t so fo p t i m a l
bids for the use values leading to participation in the auction in E.S i n c e
those sets are the supports of the bidding strategies Gi (.|.), i =1 ,2,b i d d e r s
in E0, when they take part in the auction, submit optimal bids.
The participation decisions are also optimal. If bidder i’s use value is c0
i,
his expected payoﬀ,g r o s so ft h ee n t r a n c ef e e ,w h e nh es u b m i t sr,w h i c hi s
optimal in [r, +∞),i se q u a lt o 14 ei (r). Since bidder i can always replicate
what he does for a smaller use value and obtain a payoﬀ at least as high,
the decision to participate only when his use value is at least c0
i is optimal.
Consequently, E0 is a regular equilibrium.
From (i) and (ii) (and (1)), when a bidder takes part, according to E0,
in the auction, any of his equilibrium bids wins against bids that would
contribute nonegatively to his net expected payoﬀ and loses against those
that would contribute nonpositively. The no-regret property follows.
To check that the ﬁnal allocation is the same in E0 as in E, assume, for
example, that bidder 1’s use value v1 is such that v1 ≥ c0
1 and ϕ(v1) ≥ v1.
Then, bidder 1 bids β1 (v1) and we have v1 ≤ λ
ϕ (v1)=ρ(v1,ϕ(v1)) ≤ ϕ(v1).
If v2 ≤ λ
ϕ (v1), Step 2 implies that bidder 2 with use value v2 does not bid
higher than β1 (v1). Thus, bidder 2 loses the auction and refuses bidder 1’s
oﬀer. If v2 ≥ λ
ϕ (v1), bidder 2 accepts bidder 1’s resale oﬀer when bidder 1
wins and there is no proﬁt a b l er e s a l ei fb i d d e r2w i n s 15. The rest of Result
14In fact, when the bid c0
2 of bidder 1 with use value c0
1 wins, which occurs with probabil-
ity F2 (c00
2),h eo ﬀers the resale price c0
2, which bidder 2 refuses with conditional probability
F2 (c0
2)/F2 (c00
2). Bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ is then e1 (r).S i n c e b i d d e r 1 o ﬀers at least
c0
2 as a resale price and since no resale is possible when bidder 2 with use value c0
2 and bid
r wins, such a bidder 2’s expected payoﬀ is e2 (r).
15As an example of a use value such that the bidder stays out of the auction, consider
232t h e nf o l l o w sf r o mM y e r s o n( 1 9 8 1 ) .
Appendix 3




1) is concentrated at − 1.
F2 (v2|r,r)=
F2 (v2)
(1 − q)F2 (c0
2)+F2 (c00
2)





2) − F2 (c0
2))


















δ1 (v1;r,r)=a r gm a x
p≥v1
(v1 − p)(1− F2 (p|r,r)).
Otherwise, the simpliﬁcation in the text and in Appendix 2, according to
which the revised beliefs and the resale oﬀers do not depend on the own bid,
still applies. Since bidder 1’s acceptable bid distribution is atomless, nothing
is changed for bidder 2. Bidding the reserve price is the only deviation that
t h ec h a n g eo ft i e - b r e a k i n gr u l em a yr e n d e rp r o ﬁtable for bidder 1. However,
for bidder 1 with use value at least c0
1, bidding slightly above the reserve
price is more advantageous because it increases the probability of obtaining
t h ei t e ma tap r i c e — r—not larger than the use value (here we use r ≤ c0
1)a n d
than any resale price bidder 2 may oﬀer when he bids r. Moreover, when
bidder 1’s use value is c0
1, bidding slightly above r gives bidder 1 a gross
expected payoﬀ equal to e1 (r). Reasoning as in Appendix 2, it is optimal
for bidder 1 with use value v1 <c 0
1 n o tt ot a k ep a r t .
Appendix 4
v1 <c 0
1. Bidder 2 takes part in the auction only when v2 ≥ c0
2,i nw h i c hc a s e ,s i n c e
c0
2 ≥ c0
1, no resale is possible.
24Here, we work out Zheng (2002)’s example where F1 and F2 are uniform
distributions over intervals [c1,d 1] and [c2,d 2] such that v0 ∈ [c1,d 1] ⊆ [c2,d 2].
The virtual-value functions are ω1 (v1)=2 v1 − d1, ω2 (v2)=2 v2 − d2 and




2 .T h e f u n c t i o n ψ such
that ψ(v1)=v1 + d2−d1
2 , for all v1 in [c0
1,d 1], determines the optimal ﬁnal
allocation. Since C in Assumption A (i) (Section 4) is the whole interval
(c0
1,d 1],t h ef u n c t i o nϕ∗ that determines the optimal intermediate allocation
is equal to µ2 and we have ϕ∗ (v1)=v1 + d2 − d1,f o ra l lv1 in [c0
1,d 1].T h e
value v0−d1
2 + d2 for c00
2 = ϕ∗ (c0
1) follows.
Let us set, for example, the reserve price r at c0
1. Then, from the formulas













. Again from Result 1, the following
bidding functions form an optimal equilibrium of the second-price auction
with deferred payment (see Figure 1):






,i fv1 ≥ c
0
1;













,i fv ≥ c
00
2;




















Following the construction of the equivalent equilibrium in Result 2 (Sec-
tion 3.2), bidder 1 follows the same bidding strategy16 in the standard second-
16Except that, if the tie-breaking rule does not favor bidder 1, he does not take part in
25price auction and bidder 2, when he takes part in the auction, randomizes
over bids. As we explain in Appendix 2, in order to obtain formulas for
bidder 1’s revised beliefs and bidder 2’s behavioral strategy, we can extend
α1 to the interval [c0
2,d 2] according to ρ(e α1 (b),d 2)=b or, equivalently,





. The formula (A2.1) then
gives17:
F2 (v2|b)=1 − exp
2(b − v2)
d2 − d1













≤ v2 ≤ d2;






. Proceeding as in Step 3 (see Footnote 13, Appendix
2), we ﬁnd:





2 ≤ b2 ≤ v2;







G2 (b2|v2)=e x p













.I n b o t h c a s e s , G2 (.|v2) is constant over [r,c0
2].
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